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Jurisdictional Statement

This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4103(2) Q).
The district court issued its Sentence, Judgment, Commitment in State v.

Edgar, District Court Case No. 131403330, on Jnne 24, 2015 (R. 236-39; attached at
Addendum A). Appellant Michael Edgar filed a timely notice of appeal on July 23,
2015. (R. 240-41.) This case initially came under the jurisdiction of the Utah
Supreme Court, but the Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court.

Statement of the Issues
Issue 1: In regards to the testimony of a Drug Enforcement Administration

agent, (1) did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed the testimony
or (2) was Mr. Edgar's attorney ineffective when he failed to properly object?
11

Standard of Review: A trial court's ruling nnder rule 403 is reviewed for

abuse of discretion." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ,I 47, 52 P.3d 1210. A claim of
11

ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on appeal presents a
question of law that the court reviews for correctness." State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15,

,I 11,328 P.3d 841 (quotation omitted).
Preservation: Mr. Edgar's attorney objected to the prejudicial nature of the

agent's testimony during trial. (R. 429.) But, if the attorney's objection was not

1
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specific enough, then Mr. Edgar's argument on appeal is not preserved; but an
"exception to the preservation requirement is where trial counsel's failure to
preserve the issue in the trial court is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel."

State v. Kozlov, 2012 UT App 114, ,r 35,276 P.3d 1207.

Issue 2: Was Mr. Edgar's attorney ineffective when he failed to object to the

State's request for permission to file the Second Amended Information the
morning of trial?
Standard of Review: "A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for

the first time on appeal presents a question of law that the court reviews for
correctness." Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ,r 11 (quotation omitted).
Preservation: This issue is not preserved, but an "exception to the

preservation requirement is where trial counsel's failure to preserve the issue in
the trial court is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel." Kozlov, 2012 UT
App 114, ,r 35.

Determinative Provisions
Utah R. Crim. P. 4(d)

(d) The court may permit an information to be amended at any time before
trial has commenced so long as the substantial rights of the defendant are not

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

prejudiced. If an additional or different offense is charged, the defendant has the
right to a preliminary hearing on that offense as provided under these rules and
any continuance as necessary to meet the amendment. The court may permit an
indictment or information to be amended after the trial has commenced but before
verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial rights of
the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or information may
be amended so as to state the offense with such particularity as to bar a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense upon the same set of facts.

Utah R. Evid. 403:

The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.

3
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Statement of the Case
1.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings

The State originally charged Appellant Michael Edgar with one count of
theft by receiving stolen property, nine counts of possession with intent to
distribute, and one count of use or possession of drug paraphernalia. (R. 1-3.) The
State later amended the possession charges to include an allegation that Mr. Edgar
possessed drugs and paraphernalia within a drug-free zone. (R. 170-71.)
A jury convicted Mr. Edgar on all counts and determined that Mr. Edgar
possessed drugs and paraphernalia within a drug-free zone. (R. 178-88.)
2.

Statement of Facts
2.1

Mr. Edgar is arrested.

In November 2013, a man found out about a fairly new trailer that was being

•

sold for a very low price. (R. 359.) The man suspected the trailer was stolen. (R.
359-60.) The police1 became involved, and when the man went to meet the seller

of the trailer-Mr. Edgar-the police intervened and arrested Mr. Edgar. (R. 362,

•

364, 367.)

When he was arrested, Mr. Edgar had been driving a car. (R. 379.) The car
was not his; it was registered to others. (R. 459-60.) Mr. Edgar told the police that

Officer Boren was the primary officer on that investigated and arrested Mr.
Edgar. (R. 376.) Before Mr. Edgar's trial, Officer Boren killed his two young
children, his wife, and his mother-in-law, and then he committed suicide. (R. 347.)
1
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•

•
he was borrowing the car from a friend. (R. 460-61.) After his arrest, the police did
an inventory impound search of the car and found a briefcase in the trunk. (R. 38284.} An officer popped open the locked briefcase with a screwdriver and found
various drugs and a scale. (R. 385-86.)
2.2

The State charges Mr. Edgar and amends the Information the
morning of trial.

The State initially charged Mr. Edgar by Information with, among other
things, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. (R. 1-3.) The
State later amended the Information and charged Mr. Edgar with possession with
intent to distribute and possession of drug paraphernalia within a drug-free zone.

(R. 27-29.) The State alleged in the Amended Information that Mr. Edgar
committed the crime within 1,000 feet of a ballet school. (R. 29.) The ballet school,
however, was over 1,000 feet from where Mr. Edgar was arrested. (Add. C, R. 809.)
The morning that trial began, at around 8:30am, the district court, the
prosecutor, and the defense attorney held an in-chambers conference. (Id.)
The prosecutor brought to that conference a Second Amended Information, where,
for the first time, Mr. Edgar was charged with committing a crime within 1,000
feet of the "Ultimate Sports USA Baseball and Softball Training Facility to the NW,
making it a drug-free zone." (Add. C, R. 809-10.)

•
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The prosecutor asked for permission to file the Second Amended
Information. (Add. C, R. 811.) The district court stated that it would allow the State
to file the Second Amended Information if the State called an owner or operator of
the Ultimate Sports training facility to establish proper foundation for the new
drug-free zone. (Add. C, R. 810.) The State found one of the owners of the facility,
and she testified later that day. (Id.) Mr. Edgar's attorney did some quick Google
research on the facility, and he interviewed the owner for the first and only time
during a break in the trial proceedings that morning. (Add. C, R. 810-11.)
The owner did testify about the sports facility, and the prosecutor argued in
his closing statement that based on the information elicited from the owner during
her testimony, Mr. Edgar was within a drug-free zone when he was arrested. (R.
390, 585-86.)

2.3

A witness testifies about a connection between Mr. Edgar and
high-level drug dealers.

During trial, a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent testified that
about seven months after the charged conduct in this case, Mr. Edgar called him
and said "he was seeking to cooperate with law enforcement in regard to heroin
trafficking or heroin trafficker that was operating out of the Salt Lake City area
and that he would do so in exchange for consideration with his pending charges
in Utah County." (Add. B, R. 411, 418, 419.) The agent testified that Mr. Edgar

6
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specified that the trafficker dealt in "pounds of heroin," which was valued at
around $20,000. (Add. B, R. 423.) Then the agent stated that Mr. Edgar discussed
working with other law enforcement officers, and Mr. Edgar objected. (Add. B, R.
424-25.) Outside of the hearing of the jury, Mr. Edgar elaborated on his objection,
noting "[t]he prejudicial nature of the testimony, there's other cases, he's working
with other officers here in [the] state of Utah, that don't pertain necessarily to this

•

case and we're looking at the facts for November 7, 2013 and what he was doing
at that time." (Add. B, R. 429.)
The district court granted the objection in part. Specifically, the district court
did not allow information about Mr. Edgar's prior contact with law enforcement
officers. (Add. B, R. 430.) But the court did conclude that the evidence of Mr. Edgar
contacting the agent and informing the agent of his access to heroin traffickers was
probative. (Id.) After the ruling, the prosecutor asked the agent another question,
mentioning Mr. Edgar's "ability to access pounds of heroin and a potential
Mexican drug trafficker." (Add. B, R. 431-32.)
The prosecutor again referenced the DEA agent's testimony in closing,
when he stated that Mr. Edgar's conversation with the agent was "very telling."

(R. 593.) The prosecutor told the jury, "[W]ould we be using our common sense,
our life experience be able to reach out and track down the DEA and say, Hey, I've
got these state charges, these drug charges, need some help with them, can you

•
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contact the prosecutor? What are you willing to do for me? I've got connections to
a Mexican cartel and I can help you bust someone with pounds of heroin. Well,
what a coincidence, we actually have some heroin in this case and tons of other
drugs." (R. 593.) The evidence at trial showed that the officers found 546
milligrams -1 / 56 of an ounce - of heroin in the briefcase in the car Mr. Edgar was
driving. (R. 506-07.) 2 The jury convicted Mr. Edgar on all counts.
Summary of the Argument

Mr. Edgar raises two issues on appeal:

First, the DEA agent's testimony about Mr. Edgar's connection to a heroin
trafficker should not have been admitted into evidence. The evidence associated
Mr. Edgar with a highly disliked and dangerous group-Mexican heroin
traffickers - when there was no evidence that connected the trafficker with any of
the charged crimes. Such an association was unduly prejudicial and insufficiently
probative.3

The detective that discovered the drugs initially testified that the amount of
heroin found was 14 grams. (R. 454.) But then he testified that he found "less than
a gram" of heroin. (R. 466.) Finally, the forensic scientist who tested the heroin
testified that the amount of heroin found was actually 546 milligrams, which is
less than half a gram or 1/56 of an ounce. (R. 486-88, 496, 506-07.)
3
The DEA agent also testified against Mr. Edgar in another case. That case is
currently pending on appeal. See State v. Edgar, No. 20150594-CA. Mr. Edgar
makes similar arguments about the DEA agent's testimony in this case and in No.
20150594.
2
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•

Second, Mr. Edgar's attorney was ineffective when he did not object to the
State's request for permission to file the Second Amended Information the
morning trial began. The Second Amended Information changed the location of
the drug-free zone, and Mr. Edgar was substantially prejudiced by the admission
of the Second Amended Information because he had little time to prepare a
defense.

Argument

1.

The DEA agent's prejudicial testimony should not have been allowed
into evidence.

During trial, a DEA agent offered testimony about Mr. Edgar's association
with a drug trafficker working out of the Salt Lake area who dealt with pounds of
heroin. That testimony was more prejudicial than probative and should have been
excluded under Utah R. Evid. 403. Mr. Edgar's attorney objected to the testimony,
arguing that it was prejudicial, and the district court overruled that objection.
The argument here is two-fold: (1) the district court abused its discretion
when it allowed into evidence the DEA agent's prejudicial testimony, and (2) in
the alternative, if Mr. Edgar's attorney's prejudice objection was not timely or
sufficiently specific, then Mr. Edgar's attorney was ineffective for failing to timely
and specifically object to the prejudicial nature of the testimony.

9
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1.1

The district cowt abused its discretion when it allowed the DEA
agent's testimony into evidence.

Utah R. Evid. 403 allows a court to "exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice."
Here, the minimal evidentiary value of the DEA agent's testimony was
significantly outweighed by the prejudicial nature of that testimony, and the
district court should have excluded the testimony.

The DEA agent's evidence was insufficiently probative. The probative value of
the DEA agent's testimony was low. When weighing evidence under Rule 403,
"courts may consider many factors" and are "bound by the text of rule 403." State

v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95,

,r 18.4

The evidence here was ultimately unhelpful in aiding the jury in

•

determining what actually happened in November 2013, when Mr. Edgar was
arrested. For instance, the agent's testimony was nonspecific and general: the
agent testified Mr. Edgar had "access to a heroin trafficker who was capable of
moving large quantities of heroin." (Add. B, R. 422.) No evidence existed that the
drug trafficker was involved in the charged crimes. See United States v. Espinoza,

The Utah Supreme Court has noted that "it strikes us as inappropriate for a
court to discuss the need for the evidence or the efficacy of alternative proof when
the court is analyzing only whether the evidence is unfairly prejudicial." Cuttler,
2015 UT 95, ,r 19.

•

4

10
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•

244 F.3d 1234, 1240 (10th Cir. 2001) (excluding evidence of defendant's sons' drug
convictions because there was no evidence that sons were involved in charged
crime); United States v. Romo, 669 F.2d 285, 288-89 (5th Cir. 1982) (reasoning that
defendant's contact with individuals who had convictions for drug-related
offenses was irrelevant to whether defendant was engaged in a drug conspiracy).
And although the prosecutor made much of the fact that heroin was also
found in the car Mr. Edgar was driving, what was found was 1/ 56 of an ouncea far cry from the "pounds of heroin" distributed by the trafficker. (Compare Add.
B, R. 423 with R. 506-07.)
Furthermore, the evidence did not relay any information about what
occurred in November 2013; it did not shed any light on whether Mr. Edgar knew
the briefcase was in the back of the car he was driving or whether Mr. Edgar knew
that the briefcase contained drugs.
Rather than relay information about what happened the day Mr. Edgar was
arrested, the evidence merely associated Mr. Edgar with high-level drug
traffickers without making any connection between the traffickers and the charged
crimes. The evidence did not aid the jury in its determination of whether Mr. Edgar
possessed drugs or drug paraphernalia.

The DEA agent's testimony was unfairly prejudicial. "The critical question in a
rule 403 analysis for unfair prejudice is whether certain[] testimony is so

11
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prejudicial that the jury will be unable to fairly weigh the evidence." State v. Jones,
2015 UT 19, ,I 30, 345 P.3d 1195 (quotations omitted). "Additionally, evidence is
not unfairly prejudicial because it tends to prove guilt, but because it tends to
encourage the jury to find guilt from improper reasoning." Id. (quotations
omitted). Improper reasoning includes finding a defendant guilty merely because
of an association with others (" guilt by association"), State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10,

,I 37,345 P.3d 1168, or finding a defendant guilty because of irrelevant emotional
considerations, Robinson v. Taylor, 2015 UT 69, ,I 34, 356 P.3d 1230; State v. White,
880 P.2d 18, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
The evidence of Mr. Edgar's association with a heroin trafficker encouraged
the jury to engage in improper reasoning because the evidence both influenced the
jury to find guilt by association and stirred up irrelevant emotional considerations.
Here, the DEA agent linked Mr. Edgar with a "heroin trafficker that was
operating out of the Salt Lake City area" who "was capable of moving large
quantities of heroin," "pounds of heroin" with a street value of $20,000. (Add. B,
R. 419, 422-23.) The prosecutor then summarized the agent's testimony, noting

that Mr. Edgar had an "ability to access pounds of heroin and a potential Mexican
drug trafficker." (Add. B, R. 431-32.) Then in closing the prosecutor mentioned
that Mr. Edgar "had connections to a Mexican cartel." (R. 593.)

12
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The agent's testimony, linking Mr. Edgar to the Mexican drug cartel
operating locally, "appeal[ed] to the jury's passions or prejudices" and attempted
"to associate the defendant with a feared ... group" -a foreign drug cartel. See

United States v. Reynolds, 534 F. App'x 347, 367-68 (6th Cir. 2013) (reasoning that
prosecutor's argument that a defendant brought Mexican drug cartels into the
local community appealed to the jury's passions and constituted prosecutorial
misconduct) (quotation omitted).
Not only did the evidence appeal to the jury's passions, the evidence
"implicitly associated" Mr. Edgar with a Mexican drug trafficker, even though
there was no evidence of any connection between Mr. Edgar and the trafficker in
the charged crime. See United States v. Echavarria-Olarte, 904 F.2d 1391, 1398 (9th
Cir. 1990) (holding testimony that implicitly associated the defendant with a drug
cartel was prejudicial, especially when an association with the cartel did not bear
on any element of the charged crime); see generally United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d
1008, 1017 (9th Cir.), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 246 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001)
(reasoning that the testimony that portrayed the defendant "as a member of an
enormous international drug trafficking organization and implied that he knew of
the drugs in his car because of his role in that organization" was prejudicial
because the defendant "was not alleged to be associated with a drug trafficking
organization in even the most minor way").

13
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Here, all the evidence proved was that Mr. Edgar knew drug dealers. That's
it. No evidence-not even a hint of an allegation-existed that the drug dealers
were connected with the charged crimes. The jury realizing that Mr. Edgar knew
some drug dealers was utterly unhelpful in determining whether Mr. Edgar
possessed drugs on the night he was arrested.
But what the evidence did do was raise an impermissible inference that
because Mr. Edgar knew drug dealers, he, too, was a drug dealer. See United States

•

v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 741-42 (6th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that "guilt by
association" evidence is "irrelevant to the question of a defendant's actual guilt"
and is not probative; consequently, evidence that a defendant "knew a criminal"
should have been excluded); United States v. Marshall, 173 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir.
1999) (excluding evidence that "tended to establish guilt by association - because
[the defendants] cavorted with drug dealers, they must be drug dealers
themselves"); United States v. Pritchett, 699 F.2d 317,319 (6th Cir. 1983) (reasoning
that prosecutor's questioning about defendant's association with a drug dealer
created an inference that "because [the defendant] maintained a relationship with
a convicted cocaine dealer, [the defendant] himself was somehow prone to

•

criminal activity of the same sort"). The agent's testimony inferred guilt by
association and was highly prejudicial because it may have led the jury to conclude

14
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•

that Mr. Edgar should be punished, "regardless of his liability in this particular
case." Robinson, 2015 UT 69, 1 37.
The error was not harmless. Mr. Edgar was harmed by the evidence. An

appellate court "will not disturb the jury's verdict unless the likelihood of a
different outcome is sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict."

State v. High, 2012 UT App 180,141,282 P.3d 1046 (quotation omitted). "Harmless
errors are those that are sufficiently inconsequential so no reasonable likelihood
exists that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Id. (quotations
omitted).
Here, the State's evidence against Mr. Edgar was not overwhelming. The
drugs were found in a briefcase that was locked inside the trunk of the car that Mr.
Edgar was borrowing from a friend. (R. 379, 382-86, 460-61.) Furthermore, when
the police arrested Mr. Edgar, it was in connection with a stolen trailer-Mr. Edgar
was not suspected of dealing drugs nor did the police suggest that any of Mr.
Edgar's conduct was indicative of drug dealing. (R. 362, 364, 367, 382-84.) The
police never mentioned that they saw Mr. Edgar distribute or purchase drugs.
Because the evidence against Mr. Edgar was not overwhelming, the agent's
testimony that Mr. Edgar had connections with a high-level drug dealer could
have influenced the jury to find Mr. Edgar guilty based on a person he knew rather
than on the facts presented at trial.

15
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1.2

Alternatively, Mr. Edgar's hial counsel was ineffective for not
appropriately objecting to the DEA agent's testimony.

Mr. Edgar's attorney objected to the "prejudicial nature" of the agent's
testimony. (Add. B, R. 429.) Although this should be sufficient to preserve the
prejudice argument for appeal, if this Court determines that the argument was not
adequately preserved, then Mr. Edgar's attorney was ineffective for failing to
timely raise an objection to the testimony on the basis of prejudice.
For an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must satisfy the

Strickland5 standard, which requires a defendant to prove "(1) that counsel's
performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different."

State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, iJ 18,321 P.3d 1136 (quotation omitted). "Proving that
his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
requires [the defendant] to rebut the strong presumption that under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy."

State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, iJ 34, 247 P.3d 344 (quotations omitted). Sound trial strategy
does not require trial counsel to submit a motion or lodge an objection that would
be futile. State v. King, 2010 UT App 396, iJ 33, 248 P.3d 984.

5

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
16
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Here, the failure of Mr. Edgar's trial counsel to timely object to the testimony
on the basis of prejudice constituted deficient performance. Throughout the
agent's testimony, trial counsel objected on the basis of relevance. (Add. B, R. 411,
413-14, 415,417, 420.)

In conjunction with the relevance objection, trial counsel should have also
objected on the basis of prejudice under Utah R. Evid. 403. An attorney in trial
counsel's position should have realized that testimony that links a defendant
charged with a drug crime to a high-level drug trafficker -when there is no
evidence that the drug trafficker was involved in the charged crime- is unfairly
prejudicial. See Echavarria-Olarte, 904 F.2d at 1398 (holding testimony that
implicitly associated the defendant with a drug cartel was prejudicial, especially
when an association with the cartel did not bear on any element of the charged
crime). Furthermore, trial counsel should have known that an objection to
relevance does not encompass an objection on the basis of prejudice. See State v.

Davis, 2013 UT App 228,

~

72,311 P.3d 538. And trial counsel should have known

that objections must be timely and specific. State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4,

~

14, 128

P.3d 1171.
Moreover, Mr. Edgar was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to object.
As argued more thoroughly in section 1.1, supra, the agent's testimony linking Mr.
Edgar to the Mexican drug cartel operating locally "appeal[ed] to the jury's
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passions or prejudices" and attempted "to associate the defendant with a feared .
. . group." Reynolds, 534 F. App'x 347, 367-68.
And the testimony-which only proved that Mr. Edgar knew drug
dealers - raised an impermissible inference that because Mr. Edgar knew drug
dealers, he, too, was a drug dealer. See Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d at 741-42; Marshall,
173 F.3d at 1317; Pritchett, 699 F.2d at 319. The agent's testimony inferred guilt by
association and was highly prejudicial because it may have led the jury to conclude
that Mr. Edgar should be punished, "regardless of his liability in this particular
case." Robinson, 2015 UT 69, ,r 37. For these reasons, the district court should have
excluded the testimony had Mr. Edgar's attorney timely and specifically objected
to the testimony on the basis of prejudice.
Because the jury rendered its verdict based on evidence that should have
been excluded, Mr. Edgar asks this Court to reverse the verdict and remand to the
district court for further proceedings.
2.

•

Mr. Edgar's attorney was ineffective when he did not object to the
State's request for permission to file the Second Amended Information
Mr. Edgar's attorney was ineffective when he failed to object to the State's

request for permission to file the Second Amended Information the morning trial
began that changed the location of the drug-free zone; the timing of the filing of

•
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the Second Amended Information prevented Mr. Edgar from fully developing his
defense.
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires the defendant to prove
deficient performance and prejudice. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ,I 18.
Mr. Edgar's attorney performed deficiently when he did not object to the
State's request for permission to file the Second Amended Information or ask for
a continuance. "The court may permit an information to be amended at any time
before trial has commenced so long as the substantial rights of the defendant are
not prejudiced." Utah R. Crim. P. 4( d). For a defendant to be subject to the drugfree zone sentencing enhancement, the finder of fact must determine that certain
actions occurred within a certain distance from a particular location. Utah Code §
58-37-8(4)(a).
When the State initially charged Mr. Edgar, it did not allege that the
charged crimes occurred within a drug-free zone. (See R. 1-3.) Rather, the State
amended the information shortly thereafter to allege that certain charged crimes
occurred in a drug-free zone, namely, within 1,000 feet of a ballet school. (R. 29.)
However, that ballet school was over 1,000 feet from where Mr. Edgar was
arrested. (Add. C, R. 809.)
It was not until 11 months later, on the morning trial began, that the State

presented a Second Amended Information that alleged for the first time that Mr.
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Edgar was in drug-free zone because he was within 1,000 feet of a sports facility.

(R. 30, 809-10.) Because of the timing of the filing of the Second Amended
Information, Mr. Edgar's attorney only had enough time to do some brief Google
research and talk to the State's witness during a break in trial proceedings. (Add.
C, R. 810-11.)

Mr. Edgar's attorney should have objected to the State's request for
permission to file the Second Amended Information because it substantially
prejudiced the rights of Mr. Edgar. Mr. Edgar prepared for trial for several months
knowing that the State's allegation that Mr. Edgar committed a crime within a
drug-free zone-i.e., within 1,000 feet of a ballet school-was unsupported by the
evidence. And when the State sought to amend the Information to change the
location of the drug-free zone, Mr. Edgar's attorney had little time to investigate
the new location. The timing of the Second Amended Information hindered Mr.
Edgar's ability to prepare his own defense. Mr. Edgar's attorney should have
objected to the State's request to file the Second Amended Information or at least
requested a continuance of the trial so that he could prepare a defense.
The failure of Mr. Edgar's attorney to object or ask for a continuance
prejudiced Mr. Edgar. Mr. Edgar's attorney could not thoroughly investigate the
new location of the drug-free zone; specifically, Mr. Edgar's attorney could not
measure the distance between the new location and the place where Mr. Edgar
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•

•
was arrested, nor could Mr. Edgar's attorney investigate the type of business done
at the new location.
Mr. Edgar's attorney ,-vas ineffective for failing to object to the State's
request for permission to file a Second Amended Information and for failing to ask
for a continuance to prepare a defense. Because Mr. Edgar was substantially

prejudiced, Mr. Edgar requests that this Court reverse the jury's finding that Mr.
Edgar committed the charged crimes ,,vithin a drug-free zone.

•

Conclusion
Mr. Edgar respectfully requests that this Court reverse the jury's verdict.
Not only was the jury exposed to evidence that should have been excluded - the
DEA agent's testimony that associated Mr. Edgar ,vith a Mexican heroin

trafficker-but Mr. Edgar was also prejudiced when the State amended the
Information the morning of trial to include a new location for the drug-free zone.
For these reasons, Mr. Edgar requests that this Court reverse.

DATED this 12 day of March, 2016.

Em~
ADAMS LEGAL LLC
P.O. Box 1564
Bountiful, UT 84011
eadams@adamslegalllc.com
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Michael Edgar
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Addendum A
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment in State v. Edgar, District Court Case No.
131403330, on June 24, 2015
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FILED
4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JUN 24

201!

4TH OISJBic:r
SiATEOFIJTAH
UTAH CC>tJNn,

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 131403330 FS
LYNN W DAVIS
Judge:
June 24, 2015
Date:

MICHAEL JOHN EDGAR,
Defendant.
custody: Utah county Jail

PRESENT
Clerk:
treenah
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, CRAIG R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): STEWART, GREGORY V
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: September 16, 1980
Audio
Tape Number:
301-15
Tape Count: 11:36

•

CHARGES

1. THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty
2. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty
3. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty
4. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty
5. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty
6. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - let Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty
7. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty
8. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty
9. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty
10. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty
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Case No: 131403330 Date:

Jun 24, 2015

11. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON

Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years
in the Utah State Prison.

(ii

Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 1st Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than five years
and which may be life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 1st Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than five years
and which may be life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 1st Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than five years
and which may be life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant 1 s conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 1st Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than five years
and which may be life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 1st Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than five years
and which may be life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 1st Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than five years
and which may be life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
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Case No: 131403330 Date:

Jun 24, 2015

COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the UTAH County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for
transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE

Court sentences defendant to 257 days on the Class A Misdemeanor with credit for time
served. Sentence to run concurrent.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
Court recommends Defendant not serve a lengthy sentence. Court recommends defendant be
given credit for time served of 257 days, the court also recommends defendant
participate in the Conquest Program.
SENTENCE JAIL

Based on the defendant's conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA a Class
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) The total time
suspended for this charge is 108 day(s).
Credit is granted for 257 day(s) previously served.
SENTENCE FINE
Charge ff 1
Fine: $5000.00
Suspended: $5000.00
A

Charge#

2

Fine: $10000.00
Suspended: $10000.00

Charge#

3

Fine: $10000.00
Suspended: $10000.00

Charge#

4

Fine: $10000.00
Suspended: $10000.00

Printed: 06/25/15
08:12:30
Digitized
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Pac{J23.6

4

Case No: 131403330 Date:

Jun 24, 2015

Charge# 5

Fine: $10000.00
Suspended: $10000.00

Charge# 6

Fine: $10000.00
Suspended: $10000.00

Charge fl 7

Fine: $10000.00
Suspended: $10000.00

Charge# 8

Fine: $10000.00
Suspended: $10000.00

Charge# 9

Fine: $10000.00
Suspended: $10000.00

Charge# 10

Fine: $10000.00
Suspended: $10000.00

Charge# 11

Fine: $2500.00
Suspended: $2S00.00

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$97500.00
$97500.00
$0
$0

Plus Interest
CUSTODY
The defendant is present in the custody of the Utah County jail.

Date\~MJl6

Printed: 06/25/15
08:12:30
Digitized
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

PacQ339

4

Tab B

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

AddendumB
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THE COURT:

1

2

jury.

Argument outside the presence of the

Thank you.

3

(Whereupon a lunch recess was taken)

4

THE COURT:

We're back on the record in the case of

5

State of Utah vs. Michael Edgar, Case No. 131403330.

6

record will reflect that counsel and clients are present,

7

that the jury is seated.

The

8

And Mr. Johnson, you may call your next witness.

9

MR. JOHNSON:

Thank you, Judge.

We will be getting

10

to Detective Purvis's testimony a little later on.

11

would call Agent Brandon Holmer.
THE COURT:

12
13

Okay.

The State

Let's have you raise your right

hand and be sworn by the Clerk of the Court then.

14

BRANDON LEE HOLMER

15

having been first duly sworn, testified

16

upon his oath as follows:

17

THE COURT:

You may be seated.

Invite you to speak

18

up clearly for the benefit of the record and also clearly for

19

the benefit of the jury seated to your left.

20

witness if a question is confusing to you, please advise me

21

and I'll have counsel restate it for your benefit.

22

for being here.

23

24
25

I advise every

Thank you

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. JOHNSON:
Q

Good afternoon.
126
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1

A

Good afternoon.

2

Q

Will you state your full name and spell your last

3

4

name for the jury please?
A

My name is Brandon Lee Holmer, last name is spelled

5

H-O-L-M-E-R.

6

Q

And what do you do for a living,

7

A

I'm a special agent with the Drug Enforcement

8

sir?

Administration.

9

Q

Okay, short that is DEA, right?

10

A

Yes, sir.

11

Q

Okay.

12

A

Since July of 2004.

13

Q

Okay, and before that what did you do for a living?

14

A

I served with the U.S. military and I performed

How long have you been with them?

15

duties during part of that time in the Utah National Guard

16

Counter Drug Program where I served as an analyst for

17

approximately six years.

18

Q

Okay, and before that?

19

A

U.S. Army Special Forces in the Utah National Guard

20
21
22

and LDS Mission to Argentina.
Q

All right.

We can stop there.

Won't go into your

high school English grades or anything.

23

A

Thank you.

24

Q

What sort of occupational experience do you have

25

with drug interdiction?
127
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District Attorney's Office in Salt Lake on a task force and

3

working for the State Bureau of Investigation as an analyst,

4

I was trained in the DEA Academy in Quantico, Virginia.

5

was approximately 17 weeks at the time and they cover a

6

myriad of instruction in how to perform your duties a special

7

agent.

8

Q

10

And what is drug interdiction?

start with that.
A

Drug interdiction is basically trying to staunch

the supply of drugs to the streets to getting out and

12

becoming available for users.
Q

Okay.

And so what exactly does,

14

capacity as a DEA, what does the DEA do?

15

federal or what?

16

It

I guess I should

11

13

•

Aside from the time that I spent with the FBI,

2

9

•

A

A

So, the DEA was formed in,

in your current
Is it state level,

I believe 1973

17

specifically with the aim of reducing the supply of narcotics

18

and also controlling legal controlled substances.

19

on federal level cases and if appropriate we'll prosecute at

20

other levels.

21
22
23

Q

We focus

And when you say federal level, is that, what's

that determined by?
A

What level a case is prosecuted at,

there's some

24

discretion at the investigative level but primarily it's

25

based on what legislators determine to be appropriate for
128
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1

certain offenses.

2

U.S. Congress has laid out certain levels of drugs should be

3

punished at a certain level.

4

anything below a five year - or below a 10-year minimum

5

mandatory in the federal system.

6

Q

So specifically, they have laid out, the

So generally we don't prosecute

When we're talking - without going into the

7

mandatory - how does that relate to quantity or across state

8

lines, things like that?

9

10

A

fairly serious drug offenses in terms of the MR. STEWART:

11
12

So, for federal level prosecution it needs to be

I'm going to object to this.

I don't

see how it's relevant to the case at hand.

13

MR. JOHNSON:

Giving some background to give

14

context to a conversation this agent had with the defendant,

15

Judge.

16

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well,

17

quickly as it relates to this -

18

MR. JOHNSON:

19

THE COURT:

20

Q

22

A

24

25

Yes, certainly.
- I'll reserve as it relates to

sustaining or overruling the objection.

21

23

let's move through it

(BY MR. JOHNSON)

Let's give it -

Can you summarize that then?

We're looking for traffickers, not users, people

that are moving major quantities of drugs.
Q

Okay, and in your - so on a day-to-day daily

responsibilities in your job, not talking about the DEA in
129
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1

general, what do you do?

2

A

3

It can be anything from training, anything from tactical to,

4

to investigative type things,

5

lot of time spent writing, documenting what's going on and

6

then working with confidential sources.

7

•

That's the beauty of the job I guess is it depends.

8
9

search warrant surveillance, a

Q

And what role do confidential sources play in your

A

Specifically they give us access to drug

job?

10

trafficking organizations.

11

they'll actually deal with drug traffickers.

12

hard for to walk in off the street and convince a guy that

13

I'm a bad guy and he should sell me drugs.

14

Q

Okay.

They give us information and
It's pretty

We'll get some more information in a minute.
So drawing your attention to July 29 th of

15

We'll jump ahead.

16

last year, did you give me a call?

17

A

Y~s,

18

Q

Why was that?

19

A

I'd been contacted by an individual who was later

I did.

20

identified as Michael Edgar.

He called me on the duty phone.

21

I was serving as the duty agent at that time.

22

Q

Explain the duty phone to the jury.

23

A

So the duty phone goes along with the

24

responsibility of taking any incoming cases to the office and

25

it's a publically available number.

If you call our office,
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1

our office phone after hours,

2

and we're responsible to answer it in case someone has an

3

emergency or they want to report drug trafficking activities.

4

Q

it refers you to the duty phone

In this case it just happened to be -

5

MR. STEWART:

6

THE COURT:

7

(Whereupon a side bar was held as follows:

8

MR. STEWART:

9

THE COURT:

10

Judge,
Yes,

could we approach?

sir.

(Inaudible) to this case (inaudible).
How would it be -

I mean, you can

present it as it relates to rebuttal but what is it?

11

MR. JOHNSON:

12

THE COURT:

(Inaudible).
Ahhh,

I think it is.

•

We can make a

13

record outside the presence of the jury but if it's contacted

14

independently as it relates to the resolution of the case,

15

you can have some discussions.

16

Okay?

(End of sidebar)

17

Q

18

duty phone.

19

turn or do you do it every night or what?

20

21
22

23
24

25

A

(BY MR. JOHNSON)

No,

So were you,

So you were talking about the
just happened to be - was it your

it goes a week at a time.

We rotate through

the 17 or 18 agents that are in the office.
Q

Okay,

and how soon before you called me did he call

you to the best of your recollection?
A

To the best of my recollection it was the previous

day and during our discussion he told me that the prosecutor,
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1

Craig Johnson,

2

when I called you.

was the guy handling his case and so that's

3

Q

Okay.

4

A

No.

5

Q

Your contact came from Mr. Edgar?

6

A

That's correct.

7

Q

And what did he say to you when he got ahold of you

8

on the phone?

9
10

MR. STEWART:

Judge,

just for the record, we would

object to this on the grounds of relevance to this case.

11
12

I didn't seek you out independently?

THE COURT:

I don't know the relevance.

We can

address it outside the presence of the jury if you wish to.

13

MR. JOHNSON:

I think my proffer at the bench

14

should be sufficient for us to continue with the line of

15

questioning at this point.

16
17

THE COURT:

But let's make a record outside the

presence of the jury then.

18

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, in light of that

19

we will take up a legal discussion outside the presence of

20

the jury, excuse you at this point in time and caution you

21

not to discuss the case with anyone.

22

don't show those to anyone and don't attempt to learn

23

anything about this case outside this courtroom setting.

24

course avoid any radio, TV,

25

trial.

If you've taken notes,

Of

newspaper, comments about the

With that we'll excuse the jury, then we'll take up
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1

these matters outside your presence and once I've ruled then

2

we will invite you back in.

•

Thank you.

3

(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom)

4

THE COURT:

The jury has been excused.

5

objection.

6

counsel, you may state that basis.

The basis hasn't been stated on the record and,

MR. STEWART:

7

You may then respond.

Judge, again,

8

perfectly clear for the record,

9

relevance to this case.

10

There is an

just to make this

•

I object on the basis of

This case happened in November of

2013.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. STEWART:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. STEWART:

15

THE COURT:

This contact was July 29, 2015.
'14.
'14, excuse me, all right.

Okay.

Seven or eight months after this.
Now I don't know the facts involved

16

here and you can respond briefly to that and we may need to

17

take some testimony so that in fact I can MR. JOHNSON:

18
19

22
23
24
25

I'll just ask a

couple of questions and we'll see where that takes us.
THE COURT:

20
21

Let's just do that.

Q

Okay, very well.

(BY MR. JOHNSON)

Agent Holmer, why did Mr. Edgar

indicate that he was contacting you?
A

He was seeking consideration with pending charges

by cooperating with law enforcement on other cases.
Q

State level or federal level?
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A

To my knowledge his charges were at state level.
MR. JOHNSON:

2

And Judge, the Court can take

3

judicial notice that this case, among several others were

4

pending at the time of this conversation with Agent Holmer

5

and the defendant.

6

cases.
THE COURT:

7

8

I was the prosecutor on all of those

So he would cooperate with a federal

agent as it relates to -

9

Q

(BY MR. JOHNSON)

10

cooperated?

11

A

What did he want you to do if he

He seemed to believe that I could supercede the

12

authority of the state and compel them to help him out with

13

his charges.
Q

How did my name get brought up with respect to

16

A

He told me that you were the prosecutor.

17

Q

Okay.

14
15

18
19

that?

And that by contacting me, what might

happen?
A

That he might be given a stay on the current status

20

of these charges or a reduction in his charges because of my

21

involvement and his cooperation with us.

22

23

THE COURT:

And did he promise anything in

connection with that as it relates to cooperation?

24

THE WITNESS:

25

THE COURT:

Obviously Your tie is running into the mike.
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1

THE WITNESS:

2

THE COURT:

3

THE WITNESS:

Sorry.
It's all right.
So, so whenever someone contacts me

4

I'm going to try and determine what their usefulness is to

5

the government.

6

willing to provide, what level of trafficker he could give me

7

access to and what actions he could take specifically with

8

regard to that activity.

So I questioned him about what he would be

9

Q

(BY MR. JOHNSON) How did he respond to that?

10

A

He indicated that he had access to a high level

11

Mexican heroin trafficker that operated out of the Salt Lake

12

City area.

13
14
15

Q

Okay, how much, how much quantity-wise of drugs

could he get access to?
A

Pound level quantities.

So significant

16

distribution quantities.

17

loads of heroin, we're obviously interested.

18

good sized trafficker.

19

MR. JOHNSON:

20

relevance has been established.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. STEWART:

23
24
25

Anytime there's going to be pound
That's a fairly

(i
Judge, based on that I think the

Anything further, counsel?
Ummm - no, Judge, we'll stand on

what's been presented (inaudible) the objection.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Well,

I'll overrule the

objection to outside the presence of the jury I make a
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1

determination as it relates to the nature of the

2

conversations, the basis of the conversation and the

3

projection as it relates to the usefulness of the information

4

that could be provided and that it related specifically to

5

this pending, these pending charges because there's a

6

reference directly to Mr. Craig Johnson as Deputy Utah County

7

Attorney and I will find by virtue of that and the admissions

8

involved that it is relevant.
So we'll invite the jury back in.

9

10

And it's sort of an admission against interest. I

11

would make the further observation that there's been

12

testimony already that some of the drugs involved were

13

heroin; and secondarily, the independent contact by the

14

defendant with a federal agent was initiated by him and that

15

secondarily that it would be admissions against interest.

16

(Whereupon the jury entered the courtroom)

17

THE COURT:

We are back on the record in the case

18

of state of Utah vs. Michael Edgar, Case No. 131403330.

19

Counsel and clients are present, the jury is now seated and

20

that we had some testimony elicited outside the presence of

21

the jury.

22

counsel.

23
24
25

The Court has made a ruling and you may proceed

MR. JOHNSON:
Q

Thank you.

(BY MR. JOHNSON)

You said Mr. Edgar contacted you

on the duty phone around July 28, 2014?
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1

A

Yes, sir.

2

Q

And describe that conversation from the beginning.

3

I guess had you ever talked to him before this?

4

A

No, never.

5

Q

Okay,

6

A

So Mr. Edgar identified himself, told me that he

so describe the conversation please.

7

was seeking to cooperate with law enforcement in regard to

8

heroin trafficking or heroin trafficker that was operating

9

out of the Salt Lake City area and that he would do so in

10

exchange for consideration with his pending charges in Utah

11

County.

12

cases and we had a discussion about what his ability, what he

13

could provide, what services he could provide to me

14

specifically in the course of investigation.
THE COURT:

15

16

He identified Mr. Johnson as the prosecutor over his

Let me have counsel approach just

quickly and then -

17

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows:

18

THE COURT:

He made a generic reference to his

19

cases.

20

knowing that there are other pending cases.

21

could refer to multiple charges in this case certainly but if

22

you will instruct him that I've got to narrow that.

23

potentially approaching prejudicial if he goes into each of

24

the cases and the number of charges and the nature of the

25

charges and everything else.

I don't want any plurality as it relates to this jury
Now the cases

It's

•
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1

(Inaudible conversation)

2

THE COURT:

Okay, what are we doing to do?

It's a

3

fine balance as it relates to that because I don't want all

4

four cases to be before this jury MR. JOHNSON:

5

6

It would be those two, but

(inaudible) .

7

THE COURT:

8

protect your client?
MR. JOHNSON:

9

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. JOHNSON:

12

THE COURT:

I know.

What do you do?

How do you

(Inaudible) .
I know.

I know.

(Inaudible).
Okay, yeah, he probably did.

Umrnm,

if

13

you will just advise this witness that beyond what he has

14

testified to or he heard from him that he can't open the door

15

to all the other cases that are pending and everything else

16

that way.
(Inaudible) .

17

MR. JOHNSON:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. JOHNSON:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. STEWART:

22

(End of sidebar)

23

THE COURT:

24

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows:

25

THE COURT:

I know.

If there's a specificity but -

(Inaudible) .
Okay.
(Inaudible) irrelevant to this case.

Approach again if you will,

counsel.

Again, even though the discussion may
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be, may involve other cases or other pending charges and it's

2

an admission on his part - I think opening that door before

3

this jury as it relates to exclusively here is a real

4

problem.

5

wasn't aware of it until two minutes ago.

So I don't know how to resolve that, you know,

6

MR. JOHNSON:

7

THE COURT:

I

(Inaudible) he created it.
I know he created it.

8

Is it relevant?

9

to the fact that he knows contacts and heroin traffickers and

10

It is relevant.

What do you do?

everybody else and all that -

11

MR. JOHNSON:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. JOHNSON:

14

THE COURT:

15

(End of sidebar)

16

It's relevant as it relates

Q

(Inaudible).
I know.
(Inaudible).
I don't know.

(BY MR. JOHNSON)

Be cautious.

Okay, Agent Holmer, so to just

17

reorient ourselves where we were, Mr. Edgar talked to you,

18

called you to talk about working out some considerations,

19

some sort of deal on his Utah County charges, drug charges?

20

A

Correct.

21

Q

Okay.

•

And as part of that, he was talking about

22

what he could offer in exchange for you trying to pull some

23

strings perhaps?

24

A

Yes, sir, that's correct.

25

Q

Specifically, I guess what - do you use
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1

confidential sources as part of your job?

2

A

Yes,

3

Q

Okay.

it's a huge part of what we do.
And so in speaking with Mr. Edgar,

I mean,

4

what factors play into whether you're going to actually use a

5

confidential source?

6

A

First thing would be what they can actually

7

provide, their access and placement to drug traffickers.

8

Then there are a number of other factors that we take into

9

that which include their ability to be controlled and then

10

possibly most important, how truthful and whether or not we

11

can trust them which is a delicate matter because anytime

12

you're dealing with confidential source, obviously they've

13

probably doing something they shouldn't have been doing

14

previously.

15

Q

Okay.

And so in talking with Mr. Edgar,

16

specifically when you're talking about what he could do for

17

you, what was that conversation about?

18

A

Had to do with specifically access to a heroin

19

trafficker who was capable of moving large quantities of

20

heroin.

21
22
23

Q

Did you discuss that any further with him about

what large quantities mean?
A

Well, we had to, as I recall we had to kind of

24

break it down because what one person considers a large

25

quantity may not necessarily be what I consider a large
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1

quantity or something that's worth my time and efforts,

2

quite simply because I get paid by the taxpayers to target

3

large trafficking organizations.

4

quantify what large quantities was and I believe it was

5

pounds specifically that we discussed, that he was capable of

6

dealing in pounds of heroin which, for the record, was worth

7

my time.

8
9

10

Q

Okay.

So, as I recall, we had to

Do you happen to know the street value of

pounds of heroin?
A

I believe it's over $10,000.

11

20 for a kilo,

12

confirm that.

13

just

Q

something like that,

I think we're paying

$20,000.

So what else did Mr. Edgar - well,

I'd have to

I guess at that

14

point were there some baseline rules that you talked to Mr.

15

Edgar about working with him?

16

A

Well,

I always try and kind of lay down

17

expectations.

That's a big part of confidential source

18

management is them understanding exactly what we are willing

19

to do and not do, what they're allowed to do and not do and

20

one thing that I think has some bearing is that we

21

established that we do not make promises other than the fact

22

that we are going to make recommendations.

23

dictate the terms of their cooperation when they're working

24

as a defendant, confidential source, meaning they're giving

25

us cooperation in exchange for consideration with charges.

So I do not
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1

We make recommendations to prosecutors and we make

2

recommendations to judges but we have no bearing on what they

3

decide to do.

4

seriously.

So generally speaking, those are taken pretty

5

Q

And you explained that to Mr. Edgar?

6

A

I explained that almost every time I speak to a

7

confidential source whose looking to work with us.

8
9

10
11

12
13
14

Q

Okay.

And was he willing to go along with that

A

I believe he understood that.

or ...
I think I made

myself very clear.
Q

Did he discuss with you working with any other

officers on a state level?
A

Yes, he did.

And that's another aspect of source

15

management, what's important is we, we always try and find

16

out if they are currently or have previously worked with

17

anyone else in law enforcement.

18

MR. STEWART:

19

THE COURT:

20

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows:

21

MR. STEWART:

22

THE COURT:

23

else that way.

Judge,

can we approach?

You may.

(Inaudible) .
Can't go into any previous or anything

There's no - that's improper.

24

(Inaudible conversation)

25

MR. JOHNSON:

Agent Holmer (inaudible).
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. JOHNSON:

3

Okay (Inaudible) his conversation

(inaudible} in connection with his client (inaudible).

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. STEWART:

6

THE COURT:

Pardon me?
I

(inaudible}.

What we've got here is that you've got

7

the - he can't talk about his past at all.

8

this case but he can't talk about the fact that he's served

9

as a confidential informant in the past in any form or

10

fashion.

11

that's totally out.

13

That's out totally, in my estimation.

MR. JOHNSON:

12

He can talk about

Okay?

So

(Inaudible} and because of this case

and the case (inaudible) he's trying to (inaudible).

14

MR. STEWART:

15

THE COURT:

(Inaudible) .
Well, you can call Agent Palmer as it

16

relates to that if he independently goes to him and you can

17

call him as it relates to MR. JOHNSON: I've decleared him as a witness and

18
19

that's okay with Mr. Stewart (inaudible).

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. STEWART:

22

THE COURT:

23

that.

Okay.

Well,

I don't -

(Inaudible) .
- I don't want, yeah, no you can't do

I don't want a mistrial in this case.

24

MR. JOHNSON: It's not a mistrial (inaudible).

25

THE COURT:

And it's delicate as it relates to that
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in my estimation.

1

So ...

MR. STEWART: Well, when he's done I'd like to break

2

(inaudible).

3

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. STEWART:
a

6

Pardon me?
When he's done I'd like to break for

(inaudible).
THE COURT:

7

Well, we can do it, we can do it right

8

now because we've got to make a determination as it relates

9

to the breadth of the direct examination from this point

10

forward.

11

MR. STEWART:

12

THE COURT:

13

(End of sidebar)

14

I

THE COURT:

(Inaudible).
We'll take another break.

We'll take another break so that we can

15

discuss some legal matters outside the presence of the jury,

16

and I will caution you not to discuss the case with anyone.

17

If you've taken notes don't show those to anyone. Don't

18

attempt to learn anything about the case outside this

19

courtroom setting and avoid, of course, any radio, TV,

20

newspaper comments about the trial.

21

outside the presence of the jury.

We'll take matters up
Thank you.

22

(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom)

23

THE COURT:

24

The record will reflect that the jury has been

25

Mr. Holmer,

you may be seated.

excused and counsel wish to discuss some further legal
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matters outside the presence of the jury and first of all in

2

connection with that, Mr. Stewart, you may be heard.
MR. STEWART:

3

Judge,

•

I think we're bordering on

4

testimony here that could easily lead to a mistrial.

5

Holmer has mentioned other cases, he's mentioned in working

6

with other state agents that won't be involved in this case,

7

he's talked about matters that happened well after November

8

7,

9

to further implicate Mr. Edgar in other matters.

2013 and I think the jurors have almost heard enough that,

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. STEWART:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. JOHNSON:

14
15

Agent

Okay.
Besides what we Mr. Johnson, you may be heard.
Thank you, Your Honor.

Just a

second.
This testimony is 100 percent bourne out of a

16

contact that was initiated by the defendant.

17

took a great risk in doing this, doing it under the nose of

18

his attorney at the time who as far as I know had no

19

knowledge of this conversation.

20

Holmer is an admission by a party opponent and is admissible.

21

It's relevant and frankly,

22

more prejudicial than probative.

23

the defendant,

24

defendant's knowledge,

25

substances in the briefcase.

The defendant

Anything he says to Agent

under 403, it's not substantially
While it is prejudicial to

it's certainly extremely probative of the
intent in possessing the controlled
Where the argument is going to
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1

be that, oh, it just was in the car, that he was borrowing

2

from someone or whatever and he doesn't own what's in there.

3

Certainly conversations to a DEA agent about trying to

4

negotiate this case and another case that happened on

5

November 21 st also in Lindon, the case officer in that case

6

was Detective Palmer, deputy with - actually he was an

7

officer with Provo Police Department who was with the Major

8

Crimes Task Force at the time and during that interaction,

9

two weeks after this case, the defendant tried to negotiate

10

this case and that case with Detective Palmer.

11

didn't work out, he then tried to negotiate this case with

12

Agent Holmer and gave Agent Holmer information about his

13

interactions with Detective Palmer.

14

When that

At sidebar, when we spoke about this a couple of

15

sidebars ago, the Court said that we could go into what

16

Detective Palmer's interaction and involvement was with this

17

as long as I cautioned Agent Holmer to refer to his other

18

cases as pending state drugs charges or pending Utah County

19

drug charges or pending Lindon drug charges as opposed to

20

saying there were multiple cases and I did instruct Agent

21

Holmer about that and I've been trying to keep to that in

22

directing my questions and so far I think we've done that.

23

So then when we go and talk about Detective Palmer and then

24

the objection is raised again, after we just said that was

25

allowed, permissible, that's problematic for the State based
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on the Court's prior ruling.
Again, this is information that came to my

2
3

attention because the defendant called Agent Holmer, gave

4

Agent Holmer my name, gave Agent Holmer Detective Palmer's

5

information and said this is what I can offer you, see what

6

you can do with them,

7

case.

8

He said as much.

9

happened, he wasn't seeking to set him up or something.

contact them and try to work out my

This is nothing me seeking this out from the agent.
Agent never talked to Mr. Edgar before this
This

10

is a mess that was created by the defendant and while it's

11

prejudicial and problematic and whatever you want to call it,

12

it's still lawful under the rules of evidence and ummm, and

13

so for that reason I think we should be allowed to continue

14

in this vein of questioning.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. STEWART:

Mr. Stewart, anything further,

sir?

The prejudicial nature of the

17

testimony, there's other cases, he's working with other

18

officers here in state of Utah, that don't pertain

19

necessarily to this case and we're looking at the facts for

20

November 7,

21

think-

22

2013 and what he was doing at that time.

THE COURT:

Okay.

I

I will allow it as it relates to

23

the breadth - now, my understanding would, was when I made

24

the initial ruling that Officer Palmer would be a witness.

25

Now I'm advised at the next sidebar that he would not be a
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witness.

2

MR. JOHNSON:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. JOHNSON:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. JOHNSON:

7

8

His case is (inaudible} .
- sorry.

His case is Monday's case.

Yeah.
I noticed Agent Holmer up as a

witness for this hearing not Detective Palmer.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, then let's draw a line as

9

it relates to representations relative to the other case that

10

is going to be coming up on Monday and Tuesday in jury trial,

11

13 th and 14 th of April and draw the line there.

12

drawn that line had I known that officer or Deputy Palmer was

13

not going to be called as a witness in this particular case.

14

Now, when he independently calls a federal officer

I would have

15

as it relates to potential for that officer to be involved in

16

this case and admitting that he may be useful in terms of

17

drug traffickers, then that is admissible, that's admissible.

18

He admits it.

19

and he was - so I think it's probative and - but we have to

20

be very cautionary in my estimation as it relates to the next

21

case and you probably have enough before the jury already

22

relative to that independent contact by this defendant

23

relative to the resolution of this case with a designation

24

that he is able to supply them with high level traffickers.

25

So let's - so -

He made the contact. He independently did that
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MR. JOHNSON:

1

2

Okay, based on that ruling I'll wrap

it up and we'll -

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. JOHNSON:

5

THE COURT:

Yeah, wrap it up because I - I'll just have to accept that.
- think we need to use a great deal of

6

caution in my estimation, even though that's independently

7

done on the part of the defendant probably which would have

8

been against any recommendation or approval of his attorney

9

at that point in time.

Let's get the jury back in here and wrap it up.

10
11

So

I've sustained the objection, Mr. Stewart MR. JOHNSON:

12
13

Okay.

With respect to Detective Palmer's

involvement.
THE COURT:

14

Yeah,

I sustained the objection in part

15

as it relates to the breadth and as it relates to Deputy

16

Palmer.

Okay.

17

(Whereupon the jury entered the courtroom)

18

THE COURT:

You may be seated.

We're back on the

19

record in the case of state of Utah vs. Michael Edgar, Case

20

No. 131403330.

21

seated and Mr. Johnson, you may continue with your

22

examination of Mr. Brandon Holmer.
MR. JOHNSON:

23
24
25

Counsel and clients are present, the jury is

Q

Thank you, Your Honor.

(BY MR. JOHNSON) Agent Holmer, so after the

defendant talked to you about his ability to access pounds of
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1

heroin and a potential Mexican drug trafficker, did you

2

indicate that you would contact me at his direction?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

How were you suppose to get ahold of him after you

5

spoke to me?

6

A

I was provided with a cell phone number.

7

Q

By?

8

A

By Mr. Edgar.

9

Q

And after some time in talking with me did you call

10

that number back?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

And who did you speak with?

13

A

Spoke with who I identified as Mr. Edgars.

14

Q

Okay,

15
16
17

and during that conversation did you indicate

that you would not be working with him?
A

That is correct,

I told him I would not be willing

to work with him.

18

Q

And is that the last you heard from him?

19

A

Yes.

20

MR. JOHNSON:

21

THE COURT:

24
25

Thank you.

Cross examination?
CROSS EXAMINATION

22
23

Okay, that's all I have.

BY MR. STEWART:
Q

So, when you get calls like this do you make

records of those calls?
150
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EMILY ADAMS (14937)
ADAMS LEGAL LLC
PO Box 1564
Bountiful, UT 84011
Telephone: (801) 309-9625
Emai : eadams@adamslega lie.com

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,

ORDER SUPPLEMENTING THE
RECORD

vs.
MICHAEL JOHN EDGAR,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Dist. Ct. No. 131403330
App. No. 20150605-CA
Judge Lynn Davis

This matter came before the Court for a hearing on January 12, 2016, on
request of the Court of Appeals to determine what happened at an unrecorded
pre-trial bench conference. Craig Johnson appeared on behalf of the State, and
Emily Adams appeared on behalf of Defendant Michael Edgar.
Based on the testimony received at the hearing, the Court makes the
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following findings of fact:
1. Mr. Edgar was charged by Information with, among other things,
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.
2. The State amended the Information and charged Mr. Edgar with
possession with intent to distribute within a drug-free zone. The
State a leged in t e Amended Information that Mr. Edgar committed
t e crime within 1,000 feet of a ba let sc ool.
6@

3. The ballet schoo, however, was over 1,000 feet from w ere Mr.
Edgar was arrested.
(i)

4. The trial in this case occurred on April 9-10, 2015.

5. Around 8:30am on April 9, 2015, this Court, the prosecutor, and the
defense attorney held an in-chambers conference. That conference

(ii)

was not recorded, although it was not the intent of the parties for the
conference to be an on-the-record type of hearing; it was more of a
@

conference where the attorneys touched base with the Court about
the upcoming trial.
6. The prosecutor brought to that conference a Second Amended

Ci)
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Information, where, for the first time, Mr. Edgar was charged with
committing a crime within 1,000 feet of the "Ultimate Sports USA
Baseball and Softball Training Facility to the NW, making it a drugfree zone."
7. The prosecutor wanted the police case officer to testify about the
Ultimate Sports training facility, since he had measured its distance
from the defendant's arrest, but t e defense attorney objected,
arguing that t e officer's testimony lacked foundation. T e Court
indicated that it would like y not a low the case officer's testimony
about the Ultimate Sports training facility, but that the State could
file the Second Amended Information if that State called the owner
or operator of the Ultimate Sports training facility to establish the
foundation for the new drug-free zone.
8. The prosecutor and case officer then located one of the owners of
one of the businesses located at the Ultimate Sports training facility
on the morning of April 9, 2015, and she agreed to appear at trial
later that day. The defense attorney did some Google research on the

3
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training facility briefly that morning.
9. As aforementioned, the prosecutor did ask permission from this
Court to file the Second Amended Information. The prosecutor
based the Second Amended Information on the information from
the police officer, and had he not had the testimony from the police
officer, he would not ave asked for permission to fi e t e Second
Amended Information. The Court granted permission to fi e the
Second Amended Information as long as t e prosecutor cou d get
one of the owners to testify and as long as t e defense attorney
could interview the owner during a break at trial.
10. The prosecutor and the defense attorney interviewed the owner for
the first and only time during a break in the trial proceedings on the
morning of April 8, 2015.
11. The owner did testify at trial and was cross-examined at trial.
12. As a result, the Court granted the State permission to file the Second
Amended Information, which the defendant was convicted of,
including the drug-free zone beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Approved as to form:

Isl Crai~ Johnson
Deputy Utah County Attorney
**ENTERED BY THE COURT ON THE DATE AS INDICATED BY THE COURT'S SEAL AT THE TOP OF THE
FIRST PAGE**
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on January 26, 2016, I efiled and therefore served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing on the following:
Jeffrey Buhman
Utah County Attorney
Gregory Stewart

Isl Emily Adams
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